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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and
lost among the host — as does the evening star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

— *The Voice of the Silence*

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HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

Karma, Reincarnation, and the Individual

[This article is also reprinted from the same collation of articles in THE ARYAN PATH, July 1938, from which the editorial reprint last month was taken. The late Mr. Fausset was a writer of exceptional feeling for spiritual teachings and mystical experience. In this essay he emphasizes that we must avoid the sin of separateness in our very understanding of the great doctrine of responsibility which is called Karma. Some readers may be reminded of the place in *The Key to Theosophy* where Madame Blavatsky explains the phrase used by a Master of Wisdom — "Unmerited sufferings." She points out that human beings do suffer from the actions of others, because we are all inseparable from one another. There is an interesting explanation of how a spiritual compensation follows this kind of suffering in the subjective state known as *Devachan*. Mr. Fausset's emphasis is valuable and points the way to a positive use of the fact that we are members of one another.—ED.]

DOCTRINES are apt to harden into dogmas and against this process of petrification the questioning even of the ignorant may be of service, if it is directed not towards destroying what is true in doctrine, but towards discovering a deeper meaning in it.

The doctrines of Reincarnation and of Karma have been so long and widely accepted in the East and enable us to explain so many things which Christianity for example leaves entirely unexplained, that we are apt to forget that they can only have truth for us in the degree that we make them real in our experience. For most of us whose inward vision is not opened to our past, Reincarnation is not a revealed truth, but a possible hypothesis. Re-birth is a revealed truth; for we experience it every day and more intensely in certain crises in our life. But whatever intimations of previous existence we may have (and many have none), we have no certainty, for example, that we lived before on this earth and not on some other planet where we might also have acquired the Karma which

we are working out here. I am not, however, concerned with such fruitless speculations, but rather with the suggestion that in the doctrine of Reincarnation individuality tends to be stressed too much.

We can believe that behind every painful circumstance there is a cause or a train of causes without imputing total responsibility for it to the individual who suffers most under it. Few contemplating the pronounced differences in human character and in what we might call the spiritual age of people can doubt that behind each individual born into the world there is a line of development, a genealogy of experience, varying in length and complexity. We are manifestly not all born into this world at the same stage of growth. Some are more spiritually mature than others, some more oppressed, baffled or afflicted. This is explained by those who accept[1] the doctrine of Reincarnation by the number of lives which the individual has previously spent on earth and the degree to which he has profited by them.

If we were absolute individuals, it would be a quite satisfying explanation. But in fact we are inseparably parts of a whole, of a family, a social group, a nation, of all humanity. To our direct ancestors we owe our bodies and to some extent the physical circumstances under which we live. From them we inherit tendencies to physical strength or weakness which our own conduct of life can only modify to some extent, and in the case of the most crippling disabilities, hardly at all. It may well be true that each of us is inevitably drawn to the parents, the body, and the physical environment which we have earned in previous existences and which is exactly suited to our spiritual needs in this one. But if we share our bodily Karma with a host of others who culminated in our parents, may not the more interior Karma of our character and moral disposition come to us through corresponding lines of spiritual descent? May we not, as esoteric science has been known to affirm, possess spiritual as well as earthly parents, and a family in the unseen world with which we are far more closely linked than with our earthly family in the working out of a common destiny? If this is so, the conditions into which we are born on earth, our degree of spiritual maturity or immaturity, and our potentialities for good or evil may be as much a family as an individual inheritance. And even those memories of previous existence, to which some have testified, may be reflections of earlier experiences on the line of our descent, comparable to the features of some ancestor which reappear in the face of some quite distant descendant.

We have tended so much to see the individual in separation from the whole to which he belongs that the suggestion that each of us may be enjoying the rewards of others' virtue and suffering the penalties of others'

[1] Not always.—EDS. [July 1938]

errors, however closely these others may be linked with us in the family of life, may strike many as contrary to justice. Yet the true self transcends so far our narrow conception of exclusive individuality that it is possible to reconcile a belief in individual responsibility for our own Karma with a conviction that our destiny is as much an expression of forces of which we are the heirs as the result of actions which we personally committed in past lives.

That every generation inherits its circumstances and to some extent its capacities from its predecessors, while being no less responsible for its own behaviour, is obvious. And this general law of succession and interdependence, which finds particular expression in the genealogy of families, nations, and races must surely extend to the super-physical planes. Those planes, we are told and it is reasonable to believe, contain provision for every state of being from the least to the most evolved. And we shall inevitably find ourselves after death on that plane which reflects our state, which, indeed, *is* our state. But we shall not find ourselves there alone. Behind us and with us and beyond us will be others whose struggle to ascend to the planes of perfect emancipation is as much our struggle as ours is theirs. Through our advance those who are also ourselves by ties of mysterious relationship will be helped to advance, while we in our turn shall be aided by the light that comes to us from those who are spiritually our elder brothers. And this process of mutual dependence and collaboration in the redemption of an individual and a composite self is, I feel sure, at work in us now and can be quickened in the degree that we realize its significance. For with a vision extended into the unseen world we can identify ourselves with all that is creative in our line of descent, while by acts of willing sacrifice we can suffer in our persons some of the darkness which has accumulated there through the negative acts of our spiritual ancestors and by the power of goodness and forgiveness help to transmute it into light. And we are surely strengthened to undertake this great creative labour if we realize that in our efforts to overcome evil with good we are not striving merely to reverse something in ourselves, that we are members of one family whose intertwining branches, stretching out over earth, reach into unseen worlds and that there is no single thought or act of ours which is not felt within it.

This sense of intimate association, too, in the adventure and the trials of life is the best antidote alike to a morbid consciousness of personal sin and a selfish pursuit of self-perfection. For while the sense of sin must always remain until the divided ego has returned to unity, the recognition that it is a common and a shared burden in itself reduces our sense of separateness. So, too, does the knowledge that there can be no self-perfection in which the whole of which we are a part does not participate

and that what little we achieve in growth towards real selfhood has been also in a profoundly actual sense achieved for us. Such a realization of the super-individual nature both of sinful egoism and of perfect selfhood will not lessen our personal efforts to outgrow the one and grow into the other. But it will save us from becoming wrongly self-engrossed in those efforts.

The problem of suffering, too, will be less insoluble. That the wicked should seem to prosper and the righteous be afflicted has always been hard to explain and justify. And an abandonment of merely individualistic or legal standards of justice is an essential preliminary to any understanding of the problem. Only then are we in a condition to perceive the creative value of suffering and to appraise from within the worthlessness of what the world considers prosperity. And here again the conventional interpreter of the doctrines of Karma and Reincarnation tends, I feel, to explain suffering too neatly and narrowly in individualistic terms. According to him all suffering is the fruit of private error in this or previous lives. He would doubtless admit that there are national and even racial Karmas, but these, too, he would explain as the sum of the Karmas of the individuals composing the nation or race. And even of the millions who suffered anguish and death in the Great War he would probably hold that each had earned that particular fate by his own conduct in past lives.

This is surely too narrowly individual an application of the law of cause and effect. Not only does it fail to allow sufficiently for the fact that we are in very truth members one of another, but it takes from the creative mystery that element of free giving, transcending a merely logical balance of reward and punishment, which our deepest experience tells us is divinely immanent in things. We grow by giving and receiving, not by piling up merit for ourselves. If we could not give to others beyond their strictly logical deserts, we could not receive the divine grace which is infinitely beyond our logical deserts. According to those who interpret the doctrine of Karma most strictly no-one can help to redeem another's Karma. Every grain that a man has sown he must reap himself. And of the particular grains that he himself has sown this may well be true. But the harvest a man reaps, as I have suggested, may not be exclusively his own and just as we share in and suffer through the Karmas of others, so we could not redeem our own without helping to redeem theirs. In the affairs of ordinary human life and even in the natural world this principle of mutual help is apparent. Each doubtless has his own predetermined cross to bear, but he can be aided in the bearing of it and the rigid law of cause and effect to that extent modified by the deeper creative law of charity. Why then should the possibility of vicarious suffering be irreconcilable with a true conception of Karma?

As the strong can aid the weak in the stress of some physical crisis, so surely may the spiritually strong by free acts of love take upon them some of the burden under which those linked with them are toiling, thereby helping them to find new strength of their own and to go forward, as they could not otherwise have done, to relieve in turn the burden of others. In this labour of love we work, as I have suggested, not only with those who are visibly linked with us in our earthly life, but with a vast family both here and in the unseen world of which we can but faintly divine the dimensions. If we could see the number of those who with us are struggling through darkness towards light and who depend on our fidelity to the light to hold their own in the conflict of opposed forces or to emerge from an abyss, our determination to fail less often in our own endeavour would be strengthened. And by the same vision we should see suffering, too, in a truer light, see it, in fact, less as a punishment than as a privilege whereby we pass beyond the negative conflict of pain and pleasure, beyond the power, too, of the Karmic law, to grow into the very heart of being. Into the mystery of suffering, however, there is not space to enter now. It is enough if I have suggested that behind the doctrines of Karma and Reincarnation there may be more of mystery than those who reduce them to neat formulas for explaining the inequalities of life have allowed.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

Even as the Father hath loved me, I also have loved you: abide ye in my love. If ye keep my commandments, ye shall abide in my love; even as I have kept my Father's commandments, and abide in his love. These things have I spoken unto you, that my joy may be in you, and *that* your joy may be fulfilled. This is my commandment, that ye love one another, even as I have loved you.

—*The Gospel According to Saint John*

K. GURU DUTT

The *Bhakti* Movement in India

[Shri K. Guru Dutt is an old and esteemed friend who has been a contributor for many years. He is equally at home with Indian and Western philosophical ideas. In this article he gives an account of the *Bhakti* movement in Indian religion which is both historical and philosophical. He suggests that its beginnings go much farther back into our past than commonly realized.—ED.]

IT IS necessary to view the *Bhakti* movement in India in its historic perspective in order to gauge its strength and weakness and assess its potential as a factor in the religious life of the India of the future. It also helps to trace the continuity of the notion of *Bhakti* right down from Vedic times, and to correct the common misapprehension that *Bhakti* is a latecomer in Indian religion, perhaps derived from foreign sources as some scholars suggest.

The word *Bhakti* is derived from the Sanskrit root *bhaj* which has a multiplicity of meanings, e.g., to assign, to divide; to accept; to resort to; to observe; to enjoy; to experience; to wait upon, to serve; to adore and to love. Somehow all these shades of meaning are subtly blended in the term *Bhakti* with varying emphases of which we are ordinarily unaware. The common usage is devotion (*Nishtha*), faith (*Shraddha*), and worship (*Puja*). The secondary significance of the word as separation or division (of *Bhaga,* and *Vibhaga*) is rarely envisaged. But it is none the less fundamental, implying as it does a sense of mutual relationship of complementaries, of reciprocality and participation.

Although the word *Bhakti* as such does not occur in the oldest Samhitas of the Veda, its implications are pervasive. The key-concept of the Veda is *Yajna,* the act of establishing a mutual relationship between the Devas and their worshippers: *Paraspara bhavana* as the *Gita* compendiously phrases it. And *Bhavana,* we must not forget, is a compound of faith (*Shraddha*), imagination, perception, and recollection.

Bhavana and *Shraddha* were the kernel of Vedic *Bhakti,* which was characterized by virility (*Virya*), energy (*Tejas*), and intelligence (*Medhas*), or in one word: *Shakti.* The Devas were themselves exemplifications of these qualities in which the worshipper sought to participate. The intimacies of dependent and loving relationship were no doubt invoked on occasion, but the dominant note was one of a certain parity, a mutual dependence, a respectful friendship: thus Indra was primarily the "friend among friends." The pose of surrender was not held in estimation; and the man of slavish mentality (*Dasa* or *Dasyu*) was an object of contempt. In later times, however, for historic reasons, there was a watering

down and even reversal of Vedic values. They came to be associated with *hubris* and impiety, to some extent. *Shakti* was eliminated and *Bhakti* was glorified in terms of total surrender (*Dainya*), almost exclusively; thus making it difficult to recognize the kinship of this emotional attitude with its counterpart in the Veda and the earliest Upanishads.

The word *Bhakti* with its present connotation occurs in the *Shvetashvatara Upanishad* perhaps for the first time in Vedic literature. The transition from the old to the new is best seen in the *Bhagavad-Gita,* which forms, as it were, the bridge between the two. Here, although the transcendence of the Supreme Being is sufficiently prominent, the primary relationship between Shri-Krishna and Arjuna is that of friendship and comparative equality as in the Veda. The last verse of the *Gita* strikingly highlights their conjoint association as the condition precedent for all spiritual and temporal welfare. The great grammarian Panini (500 B.C.), who has an aphorism explaining the meaning of *Bhakti* as loving devotion, refers to Vasudeva and Arjuna as both divine.

It is in the Itihasas and Puranas that the cult of *Bhakti* flowered and through them that it evolved into a popular movement. It is necessary here to remove a common misconception. Although the likely date of their composition as inferred from their language and part of their contents may be comparatively recent, it is beyond doubt that the core of the Puranas, as the name itself implies, is of immemorial antiquity. This can be gauged from the fact that it was the practice to recite these ancient histories during the great Vedic sacrificial sessions. The names *Itihasa* and *Purana* occur in the earliest Upanishads also. It may thus be safely said that the core of the Puranas coexisted with the Vedas. Each one of the Puranas brought into vogue the worship of the Supreme Being in one form or another, principally Vishnu and Shiva or their numerous derivatives and manifestations.

The themes of the *Puranas,* as well as their modes of approach, have much in common. From our angle, their distinction is that they advocate a theistic approach to a personal God, and "loving devotion" as the easy and congenial means. The *Mahabharata* can singly represent all of them. As it proudly declares, and not without justice, whatever relates to the three ends of human life will be found therein, and what is not in it will not be found anywhere else. And the heart of the teaching of the *Mahabharata* is to be sought in the balanced message of the *Gita.* There is an impression that the *Gita,* and in some measure the Puranas, disclose a reaction against the Veda. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The Indian tradition can be rightly understood only as a complex harmony which blends apparent inconsistencies in a larger perspective (*Saman-*

vaya). As the *Mahabharata* puts it:

> *Itihasa-puranabhyam vedam samupabrimhayet*
> *Bibhety alpashrutad vedo mam ayam praharisyati.*

The teachings of the Itihasa and Purana supplement the Veda, which is afraid of the man of narrow vision.

The *Bhagavata Purana* is the *locus classicus* of the *Bhakti* cult, embodying its maturity and fruition. Although its terminology is Vaishnava in texture, its principles are acceptable to all *Bhaktas,* who may be called all Bhagavatas, irrespective of whether they worship God (*Bhagavan*) as Vishnu or Shiva. The antiquity of the Bhagavata persuasion can be judged from the inscription on the Garuda column erected by the Greek envoy Heliodorus at Besnagar (second century B.C.) in which he describes himself as a *Parama Bhagavata,* the worshipper of Vasudeva, the god of gods. The implications of this have to be aligned with the view of scholars that the *Bhagavata* is the most recent of the Puranas, having been composed as late as the seventh or eighth century A.D.

It is of great interest to note that the *Bhagavata* declares that *Bhakti* had its origin in Dravida (Tamilnad). As a matter of fact it is in the earliest Tamil literature that the sources of *Bhakti* as a popular movement are to be traced. Running on the parallel lines of Vaishnavism and Shaivism, we have in both first a line of mystics and saints who flourished in the seventh and eighth centuries and even earlier. They were wandering singers drawn from all classes and ranks of society who loved and praised God to the point of madness, whose devotional songs composed in the vernacular have come down to us. They were in due course followed by philosophers who built up theistic systems of thought.

The Vaishnava saints are known as Alvars, traditionally twelve in number, filling up the gap between the *Bhagavad-Gita* and Ramanuja. The greatest of them were Nammalvar and Tirumangai Alvar. The hymns of the Alvars are collectively known as the *Nalayira-Prabandham,* often eulogized as the Tamil Veda. Together with the Upanishads, it forms the basis of the Vishishtadvaita system which is accordingly called *Ubhaya-Vedanta.*

Corresponding to the Alvars, we have the Nayanmars in Shaivism, the most important among whom were Appar, Sambandhar, Sundarar and Manikkavachagar. Towards the end of the tenth century, their hymns were compiled into a single collection *Tirumurai* by Nambiandar Nambi, including the *Tevaram* of the first three and the *Tiruvachagam* of the last. Between them, the *Tirumurai* and the *Prabandham* contain some of the most moving devotional poetry in the world.

About this time, the main tenets of the *Bhakti* school seem to have

been formulated in the *Bhakti Sutras* like those attributed to Narada and Shandilya. In the twelfth century, the philosophy of *Bhakti* was fixed on a firm foundation by Ramanuja, claiming to follow an ancient and unbroken tradition. His lead was followed, each with his own distinction, by Madhva, Nimbarka, and Vallabha. It must not be forgotten that Shankara, notwithstanding his strong leanings towards *Jnana* and *Sannyasa,* was himself a great *Bhakta* and wrote some of the most beautiful and impassioned *stotras* in the Sanskrit language, whose vogue has been so great that they must be counted among the props of the popular *Bhakti* movement. It may be added here that in the thirteenth century Meykandar systematized the Shaiva Siddhanta; while a little earlier Basaveshvara had expounded his reforming doctrine known as Virashaivism. He was followed by a great line of Shivabhaktas like Allama Prabhu and Akka Mahadevi, all belonging to Karnataka. Their *vachanas* and songs are inspired by the most intense faith and devotion.

The spread of the *Bhakti* cult from the South to the North was heralded by its early flowering in Maharashtra, which lies midway. It was in 1290 that the great mystic and saint Jnanadev wrote his *Jnaneshvari,* an elaborate exposition of the *Gita* in Marathi verse, which has become the Bible of Marathi devotion. He also composed numerous *abhangs* in honour of God Vitthal of Pandharpur, initiating a school of devotion which is flourishing even today. Its shining galaxy includes stars of the first magnitude like Namdev, Eknath, and Tukaram.

It is of interest to note that the deity Vitthal is believed to have been imported into Maharashtra from Karnataka. Vitthala was the objective of Purandaradasa's fervent adoration. In his wake followed a brilliant succession of saintly singers (*Dasaparampara*) comprising Kanakadas, Vijayadas, Gopaladas, Jagannathadas and others less well known who constitute the pride of Karnataka.

In the North, the flood tide of *Bhakti* was released in the early fifteenth century by Ramananda, a Vaishnava Brahmin from the South who founded a Math in Banaras and composed hymns in the language of the people. He had numerous disciples among whom was the famous Kabir, born a Muslim. The *Bhakti* movement in the North was predominantly Vaishnava in complexion; and the broad division was between the devotees of Rama and those of Krishna, subdivided into many groups or *panths,* including those who used names like Rama or Hari to denote the Supreme Being, but like Kabir or Nanak preferred to dwell on Him as Formless, the *Nirgunapanthis.*

In the direct line from Ramananda were Tulsidas, author of the celebrated *Ramcharitmanas*; Nabhadas, the author of the *Bhaktamala*, a work narrating the lives of the saints; and Malukdas. Among the well-known

Krishnabhaktas were Surdas in U.P., Chandidas in Bengal, Vidyapati in Bihar, Mirabai in Rajasthan and Narsinha Mehta in Gujarat. Foremost among the *Bhaktas* in Bengal must be mentioned the God-intoxicated Chaitanya, who was influenced by writings of Nimbarka and Vishnusvami, as well as by the songs of Chandidas and Vidyapati.

Thus the mighty river of *Bhakti* has flowed through the centuries gathering force and volume in its course, rejuvenating the life of the spirit which had got choked under a load of rituals and observances which had survived their meaning, and a forest of invidious distinctions like those of caste and creed. In its progress it has thrown up many humble men of genuine spiritual attainment whose names are unknown beyond their small circles of influence, and occasionally a mighty genius like Tyagaraja. All honour to them.

So much for the part of the *Bhakti* movement in India. We may conclude with a few after-thoughts. It has to be borne in mind that *Bhakti* has been an important ingredient in all religions, emotional intensity serving as a unifying factor in experience. Although any type of emotion might serve equally, the orthodox one has been that of complete and one-sided dependence. As A. N. Whitehead pointed out, even in Christian theology and in the patterns of Christian emotion, the ancient concept of a Divine Despot and a slavish Universe has prevailed throughout history. This holds of India also where the orthodox relation of the devotee to God has been pictured as that of master and servant (*Dasya*), by and large. Total self-abasement and a certain unworldliness have been the *sine qua non* among the *Bhakta*'s qualifications, altogether pictured in a minor key.

But today, all the world over, the pattern of values and of human allegiances is changing rapidly; and servility is being felt to be as much out of place in religion as in politics. If religion is to survive, it must find a place for manly independence and self-respect, vigour of intellect and zeal for the world's work — in a word, *Shakti* — as integral elements in religious emotion. There is such a thing as spiritual *Swarajya* also.

It is India's distinction to have realized that by whatever path men may choose to approach God, He welcomes them by that very path. All paths are His. The times seem to demand a going back to the virile *Bhakti* of the Veda and the militant *Bhakti* of the *Gita*. If Shri-Krishna and Arjuna should once again be brought together in their essential natures in men's hearts, India's future, temporal as well as spiritual, is guaranteed:

Yatra yogesvarah Krishno yatra Partho dhanurdharah
Tatra Srir Vijayo bhutir dhruva nitir matir mama!

K. GURU DUTT

H. J. J. WINTER

Science and Faith

[Dr. H. J. J. Winter, M.SC., PH.D., D.SC., is the author of many research papers and several books on the history of scientific thought. Readers will remember his recent article "What Is the Philosophy of Science?" In this article he provides part of the answer. In his discussion he considers what some great scientists and many philosophers have had to say about that principle of order in the universe which in different aspects is the focus of science, philosophy, and ethics.—ED.]

CIVILIZATION began in the River-Valley Cultures of the Ancient East, with the peoples of the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates, the Indus, and the Yellow River. The domestication of water encouraged settled communities, and from their earliest history there have been among them those who sought significance behind the commonplace, purpose and design behind events. Around 600 B.C. this speculation took a decisive turn, and was crystallized in the thoughts of Confucius and Lao-Tze in China, Buddha and Mahāvīra in India, Zoroaster in Persia, the Hebrew prophets in the Near East, and the Ionian School, particularly Thales, in Greece. In all but Greece religion and philosophy predominated. Any scientific achievements either grew out of these or were absorbed by them, and technology, then an art, consisted of isolated invention.[1] What the Greeks did was slowly to emancipate science from theology and mysticism, mythology and astrology, and to foster a spirit of rationalism, an objective investigation of nature and a logical treatment of the evidence she afforded. This meant induction for the formulation of premisses, and deduction from these generalized premisses to particular conclusions. The *Elements* of Euclid, a striking illustration of the power of deduction in unfolding and revealing the implications and potential of the fundamental premisses, represents not only three centuries of geometrical progress but is one of the monumental achievements of mankind. On the other hand, a deductive process can elaborate *only* what is implied in the premisses, and should these be in any way restricted or faulty, then the superstructure will develop flaws as does a house built upon an insecure foundation. Lacking the instrumental technique of modern science, the Greeks had to rely almost entirely upon *uncontrolled* experiment, where the various conditions operating in a given situation were outside of man's influence in the then contemporary setting. Since the seventeenth century, when the Scientific Revolution which has so altered our lives began to unfold, men have increasingly mastered the *controlled* experiment by means of a more and more refined instrumental technology allied with a precise definition of

[1] H. J. J. WINTER: *Eastern Science* (Wisdom of the East Series. London, 1952)

the physical quantities to be measured. Now the premisses are obtained by induction through experiment, and rely for their validity upon the accuracy of their experimental foundations. Though the Greeks thought about atomicity, for instance, their investigations belonged to philosophy, because they were unable to "measure" atoms by the sophisticated techniques used by the modern chemist. Strong in philosophy and deductive logic, the Greeks were weak in the consequences of their inductions through lack of experimental refinement.

The activity of science implies system and order. Scientists could not work without this basic faith. In spite of a "law of cussedness" which all frustrated experimenters have from time to time had to face, when everything seemed to go wrong for no apparent reason, the armoury of the scientist includes the assumption that if an experiment is repeated *exactly* then the same results will also follow, i.e., if an antecedent A is followed by a consequent B under certain controlled conditions, then if those conditions are identically reproduced on a future occasion, the presence of A will again be followed by B. In fact, it is not always possible to guarantee that exactly identical conditions will prevail, but a series of results examined statistically enables the scientist to proclaim an ordered sequence underlying them. Scientists at the present time have not the same faith in rigid determinism as was held by their Victorian forerunners, but they still believe in an ordered universe as opposed to chaos and would be sadly troubled if experimental results always failed to reveal a pattern. As Einstein once said — "God may be subtle, but He is not malicious."

The belief in system and order has grown from time immemorial; night and day, the movement of the heavenly bodies, the ebb and flow of tides, the symmetry of men and animals, the patterns of flowers — and, revealed later by optical magnifications, the fascinating elegance of the snowflake — all these and a thousand other instances, as our knowledge of the universe increased, have induced in men a sense of security through prediction. Whether this is the only knowledge of which we are capable, as the materialist might assume or a practising scientist be content with, or whether it reflects a more *absolute* order, may be immaterial to the pragmatist happily content with immediate cause and effect or method and results. What matters is that order of some kind is assumed, and the faith of the scientist lies in his commitment to investigate its form. We may differ as to what we understand is the external world. Both Einstein[2] and Planck[3] believed in an external order which was capable of objective evaluation, that is, a world existing outside of us, a world to which we

[2] A. EINSTEIN: *The World As I see It* (London, 1935), pp. 126 and 131, among others

[3] M. PLANCK: *A Survey of Physical Theory* (Dover Publications, 1960), pp. 20–26

hope to address the right questions so that we may receive in return some fitting answers. To Mach[4] the real world was in the mind, the conceptual framework fed initially upon the sensations; this was all we knew. It recalls the dictum of Descartes — *Cogito, ergo sum.* Whatever the arguments of philosophers about the world of events, most experimental scientists plod on unceasingly with their own researches, content to explain these events in the most useful conceptual scheme available to them at the time, ignoring the metaphysical and leaving mankind in general to judge their labours by their apparent results; these, being frequently technological, are easily assessed in terms of man's mastery over his environment, as, for instance, in the Concorde or the space vehicle. Science as an activity may be adequately judged by its impact upon society.

Is there, however, nothing beyond the merely utilitarian? Does the immediate world of phenomena act as the source of everything we may ever know? Or do we indeed in our earthly existence look through a glass darkly? Sir Isaac Newton, though his explanation of the universe in terms of dynamics later roused the materialists, such as Cabanis and Büchner, to new heights in which matter, force, and energy supplanted God, was himself quite clear in his distinction between science, which dealt only with second causes, and God, whose concern was with first causes. Science could investigate *how* the universe behaved in the material sense, but could not possibly tell why it functioned in particular ways and not in others. May we say then that God operates in nature, is immanent, is the Supreme Intelligence in the universe? If so, the simple faith of the scientist in the essential rightness of his experiments, that if he plays fair with his equipment it will play fair with him, that nature will reveal her secrets only if the approach is perceptive enough, and will indeed do so if he meets her conditions — may not this faith be regarded as a dim reflection of that greater faith embodied in religion? Science and religion may be complementary, and need not necessarily meet in conflict, as they have done so often in the past at the sectarian level. In the words of Charles G. D'Arcy:

> To bring in at any point in this system (the universal process) a supernatural element would certainly be a breach of scientific method. But it is altogether different when, rising above the scientific point of view, we regard the natural process as a whole, and discern that it is impossible to explain it apart from the conception of a Universal Intelligence.[5]

This essentially pantheistic argument, however, apart from its neglect of the great human problems of free-will, evil, and pain, brings us face to

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[4] E. MACH : *Beitrage sur Analyse der Empfindungen* (Jena. 1886), pp. 23, 142

[5] C. F. D'ARCY : *Science and Creation : The Christian Interpretation* (London. 1925), p. 67

face with an assertion of Sir Arthur Eddington[6] to the effect that religion does not depend on the substitution of the word "God" for the word "Nature," and to Professor E. H. Coulson's denial[7] of "a God of the Gaps," i.e., a God whose territory is being slowly eroded by the persistent and relentless progress of man's scientific conquests. Nevertheless, despite the stupendous achievements in, for example, space travel, the moon is but a satellite of the earth, and our own solar system but part of the spiral nebula of the Milky Way, and millions of such nebulae exist; so when we contemplate the vastness of the universe in terms of light-years the human mind simply boggles in confusion. It is not likely that "a God of the Gaps" will concede very much in the course of the centuries. But the objection remains, and to answer Professor Coulson we have to look for a different source of knowledge outside of science, and in an existence not limited by space and time, or space-time.

Such an enquiry reveals two possibilities: either we can postulate an Absolute, the real world behind the physical world of transient phenomena, in which God *knows* all those scientific laws which are only to be approached by the human mind through statistics and probability and relevance, and which scientists can only dimly comprehend; or we can assume that God is outside of this physical universe altogether, undoubtedly operating within it but from a vantage point not subject to its laws; in other words, He is not only immanent, but, most importantly for religion, is also transcendent. If we are committed Christians the life and crucifixion of Jesus affirms the latter without question. Moreover, God has also revealed his message in his own way through Muhammad, and through Buddha, and through other religious teachers at different times and in distant places. Thus there is scientific faith and there is religious faith. They are distinct in that the former, since "the exploration of the external world by the methods of physical science leads not to a concrete reality but to a shadow world of symbols,"[8] derives initially from sense-impressions, whilst the latter is a conviction or *revelation* in the self-knowledge of the mind of the omnipotence of God. But we may also regard them as being bridged by immanence, in that the methods of physical science yield a "shadow world of symbols" which suggest "a concrete reality" underlying them and into which "those methods are unadapted for penetrating."[9] Through this "concrete reality" or Absolute, God operates upon the processes of the natural world. Those who did not misinterpret Darwin's theory saw in it a reflection of that great Purpose

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[6] A. EDDINGTON: *Science and the Unseen World* (London. 1929)

[7] E. H. COULSON: *Science and Christian Faith* (Oxford, 1955. Fontana, 1958), pp. 32, 41

[8] A. EDDINGTON: *op. cit.*, p. 45

[9] A. EDDINGTON: *loc. cit.*

or Design,[10] not a process claimed only for antiquity, but like a living stream presenting us with forms whose characteristics here and now are the result of the experience of countless generations. As for the inanimate world, astronomers have recently explained the universe by a steady-state theory[11] in which matter is continuously re-created in outer space. The secrets of the universe lie not in rest, but in motion unceasing, in change and in adaptation.

The principle of order in the physical universe and also in human affairs (the moral law) is at the root of science, philosophy, and the practice of religion (excluding revelation). It appears as *ṛta* in the *Ṛgveda* and as *physis* in Greek science. With the emergence of Buddhism a rationalistic approach to the world as a process causally determined encouraged scientific method in India.[12] Logic and classification became more acute. Concepts of causality (*hetu*) and of law (*dhammatā*) crystallized. However, to Buddha experience was either objective, through phenomena, or transcendental;[13] the latter, being of the Absolute, lay outside of logic. Each encouraged its own kind of faith.

In recent years a remarkable reconciliation of science with the Christian faith has been made by the Jesuit Pierre Teilhard de Chardin,[14] using the theory of evolution as the thread linking such apparently diverse human experiences as the so-called facts of the experimental scientist with the visionary and spiritual aspects of human personality. Science and faith cannot be understood in terms of their history of conflict and duality but only in synthesis. Indeed, science requires mysticism to attain its highest fulfilment. If we imagine the great stream of consciousness, life, and evolution, then science, which at particular instances of time makes cross-sections *across* the flow and can therefore achieve only fragmentary pictures requiring to be pieced together to reach some measure of totality, clearly must find an ally moving *with* the stream to make this measure whole. This ally is religious faith. In the process of becoming, the traditional view of cosmology is to be replaced by a more active concept, cosmogenesis, and the future progress of man to be regarded as a psychological advance leading to higher degrees of organization. Realization and fulfilment can come only through an extension of knowledge within the framework of wisdom and love.

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[10] Which has a still earlier history. See C. E. RAVEN: *Organic Design* (Friends of Dr. Williams's Library, Seventh Lecture. Oxford. 1954)

[11] See, e.g., R. A. LYTTLETON: *The Modern Universe* (London. 1956), Ch. VI; *Rival Theories of Cosmology* (Oxford. 1960)

[12] G. S. P. MISRA: "Logical and Scientific Method in Early Buddhist Texts" (*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London. 1968. Pts. 1-2, pp. 54-64)

[13] Buddhists might use this term, but in the context of this article I use "immanent."

[14] PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN: *The Phenomenon of Man* (London. 1959)

Mankind is part of nature, and therefore cannot transcend her in terms of phenomena. Consequently, science is restricted by man's own environment. God cannot be an entity to which one adds or subtracts what is scientifically known through the canons of induction. If we are to transcend nature we can only do so by direct communion with God. The God of the scientist and the metaphysician is, in the words of A. J. Balfour,[15] "the logical glue which holds multiplicity together and makes it intelligible." This implies a faith in the order of the universe, and may lead some to postulate an Absolute behind it. But there is also the personal and transcendental God, from whose *ethical* personality flows our moral law, whose voice is heard through mysticism and revelation and who involves the human personality in the "love and worship (of) a Spirit among spirits."[16] Being transcendent He may not be concerned with the Absolute at all if this term be defined purely in terms of the logical and intellectual. Since we cannot prove the existence of God by the processes of logic, we here face a dichotomy, which it was suggested earlier *might* be bridged by immanence. There are as many interpretations of God as there are schools of philosophy — Sir J. J. Thomson, the famous Cambridge physicist, dismissed the exercise of philosophy as like looking for a ray of light in a perfectly darkened room — so there is no finality about the argument. In the last resort, conviction grows within each of us, to be happy we must believe in *something,* and to what limited extent we accord to the process of science a divine connotation depends on the values, which lie outside of science, of the beholder.

H. J. J. WINTER

Learn that no efforts, not the smallest — whether in right or wrong direction — can vanish from the world of causes. E'en wasted smoke remains not traceless. "A harsh word uttered in past lives is not destroyed, but ever comes again." The pepper plant will not give birth to roses, nor the sweet jessamine's silver star to thorn or thistle turn.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

A. J. BALFOUR : *Theism and Humanism* (London. 1915), p. 20

A. J. BALFOUR : *loc. cit.*

ARTHUR L. HERMAN

Is Modern Science Immoral?

[Mr. Arthur L. Herman, an American University teacher, is well known to our readers by his many articles on philosophy and art. In this paper, of which we print below the first part, he puts forward senses in which modern science is in practice immoral. In the second part, to appear next month, this explanation will be completed and we shall have his suggestions as to how this condition can be ameliorated.—ED.]

I

I want to make two extremely simple points in this brief paper and both of these points deal with the present and the future of science. The first of my conclusions will be that science has become and will for the immediate future continue to be an essentially immoral discipline, and that nearly all scientists today are immoral creatures. The second of my conclusions rests essentially on the first and it is that science is not doomed necessarily to remain immoral but that it can become moral when scientists become fully aware of how they must relate to their discipline and what the moral implications of that relation must be. This second part of the paper then will promise some kind of amelioration from the rather harsh conclusions of the first part.

With my intentions made manifest, now, let me get on with the first business at hand: Science today is an essentially immoral discipline. There are a number of ways of arriving at this conclusion and I might mention a few of the more obvious ones.

(1) Quite recently there was an outbreak of student enthusiasm on the University of Wisconsin, Madison, campus, shown to welcome the representatives of the Dow Chemical Corporation. The students argued that Dow Chemical, which makes Saran-Wrap for sandwiches, was making napalm-wrap for human beings, and that since napalam is productive of human suffering, violence, and death, Dow Chemical should stick to Saran-Wrap, which, while less profitable per dollar invested, is still a more proper product for an American chemical company.

It can be contended that, if the students were right and Dow Chemical was immoral in what it produced, then Dow Chemical employees are immoral for producing what they produce. Further, many Dow Chemical emloyees are scientists, research and development personnel, engineers and technicians, and these scientists must also be called "immoral." Now, in so far as science as a discipline can be identified with those scientists that compose it or make it up, science, too, is immoral. That is to say, if one takes the attitude that all abstract nouns ("science," for example) are to be identified with a class of particulars (scientists, for example), then the

property belonging to the particulars must belong to the abstract noun. Hence, science is immoral.

(2) Dow Chemical is not a uniquely immoral company. One has only to cast broad glances across the vast military-industrial wasteland offering job opportunities to graduating scientists to realize that nearly half of the vacancies available are with organizations engaged directly or indirectly with producing in one way or another human misery, suffering, violence, and death. These organizations have been built by scientists (in the broad sense of that word, "anyone with intensive theoretical or technical training in one or more of the sciences"), developed by scientists, and maintained by scientists. The physicist, the chemist, the biologist, the mathematician, the geologist, the engineer (electrical, chemical, sewer, city, garbage, and so on) can all find a well-paying niche in the American military or the American industrial complex. The price to be paid is rather meagre by contemporary standards — one need merely refrain from asking, "Is what I'm doing right?" And in so far as one does not ask that question, I would contend that one is immoral. In so far as contemporary science (scientists) does (do) not ask it, science is guilty of the great and modern sin of omission. Hence science is immoral.

(3) Science has assumed for such a long time that, because its methods and procedures are amoral, it as a discipline must also be amoral. The great German rocket expert Wernher von Braun contended at his de-Nazification hearing that he could not be charged with war crimes because as a scientist his only job was purely scientific — trying to plan, design, and fly the giant V-2 rockets; his only job was getting them off the ground for a sustained flight. If someone wanted to load them with a high explosive charge and aim them at London, well, then talk to the High Command in Berlin; von Braun contended that was not his business. One is reminded of the statement made by that super-technician and super-processor of human beings, Colonel Adolf Eichmann, when he said, that he "was merely 'a little cog' in the machinery that carried out the directives and orders of the German Reich." (*Life*, 30 June 1961)

Similarly one could argue that those chemists who put up large concentrations of cyanide for delivery within the confines of the Third Reich and who never bothered to ask where it was going, how it was to be used, and what the nature of their involvement was, were as guilty by their sin of omission as those technicians who loaded and dropped the pellets in the gas chambers at the various death camps inside and outside the Third Reich.[1] Eight million Jews died with the help of German scientific genius, and apparently German science never bothered to ask questions

[1] Cf. DWIGHT MACDONALD : *The Root Is Man*, pp. 2-3, for a description of German science and scientists at their technical best in this particular enterprise.

about its own moral role in the whole process of the state's manipulation and implementation of science. This view, that science is amoral, so popular with scientists for such a long time, is forthrightly summarized by the famous Harvard physicist, P. W. Bridgman:

> Scientists aren't responsible for the facts that are in nature. It's their job to find the facts. There is no sin connected with it, no morals. (*The Manchester Guardian,* 22 April 1954)

Bridgman apparently also believes that the scientist is not responsible for how those facts are found and what is done with them when they are found. The same attitude regarding the scientists' amoral search for truth is expressed by Albert Einstein in his book *The World As I See It*:

> But the pursuit of scientific truth, detached from the practical interests of everyday life, ought to be treated as sacred by every government, and it is in the highest interests of all that honest servants of truth should be left in peace. [This passage comes from a letter written in 1933 and directed to "Signor Mussolini" — p. 27].

In opposition to this view I would contend that every act of every human being (scientist and non-scientist) is charged with moral implications. The death camps, I believe, have taught us that no-one anywhere in the world can live and work amorally any more. Scientific procedures, from hunch to hypothesis to evidence to theory to law, are charged with moral values because they are charged with moral implications.

Thus in opposition to Dr. Bridgman's view of science stands that of J. Robert Oppenheimer, former director of the scientific laboratories at Los Alamos, New Mexico, during World War II. He was the chief scientist in charge of the research development that led to the production of the atomic bomb. When the first atomic explosion was touched off in New Mexico in 1945 Dr. Oppenheimer quoted from the Hindu *Bhagavad-Gita,* "I am become death, the shatterer of worlds." Then he said, *à propos* of the bomb that he and his fellow scientists had created: "The physicists have known sin, and this is a knowledge which they cannot lose." (*The Manchester Guardian,* 22 April 1954).

It is interesting to note that when Dr. Oppenheimer was later denied a security clearance, the denial was based in part on his awareness that the scientist cannot escape the moral implications of his work. The transcript of the 1954 *Hearing Before the Personnel Security Board* in Washington, D.C., reads: "It was further reported that in the autumn of 1949, and subsequently, you strongly opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb on (1) moral grounds. ..." (*In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer,* p. 6)

And similar to the moral reaction of Dr. Oppenheimer was the stand

taken by Major Claude Eatherley, the pilot who led the Hiroshima A-bomb mission in World War II. In his book *Burning Conscience* Eatherley says of that mission that later drove him to near suicide and a complete mental breakdown: "We have to answer not only for our own individual acts, but also for the team acts in which we just participate or are made to participate." (p. 109).

Earlier in the same book he had summarized the issue for us all when he said:

> In the past it has sometimes been possible for men to "coast along" without posing to themselves too many searching questions about the way they are accustomed to think and to act — but it is reasonably clear that our age is not one of these. (p. 6)

Morality invaded the laboratories in Germany too late. I am contending here that a similar situation can be found today in our own laboratories in the United States. There is a kind of value blindness present in the scientific mind's inability to look beyond its own immediate involvement in scientific affairs, a value blindness present within the mindless insistence that what is good for research and development for the Fatherland or at good old general Tool and Die must somehow or other be just grand for the rest of the world. This is why I say science is immoral.

ARTHUR L. HERMAN

(*To be concluded*)

The Streets

The soul knows dim-lit streets that lead to wind-swept corners where evil things lurk in the shadows, monstrous things without true form or substance, waiting to pounce on the unwary wanderer. Bleak and forbidding are the houses in those streets and the lights in the windows gleam like evil eyes.

The soul knows sunlit streets that lead to open country where fields are flushed with summer and larks sing joyously. The sea gleams blue and still in the distance and the clouds are bright with the light of truth.

—HERBERT BLUEN

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

Literature as *Sadhana*

A Note on Raja Rao's *The Cat and Shakespeare*

[Dr. K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar, well known for his works of literary criticism and as an educator, writes lucidly and understandingly about Raja Rao's novel *The Cat and Shakespeare*. Raja Rao is one of the most important of Indian authors who have written in English; he is also sometimes felt to be difficult though evidently significant. Dr. Iyengar's essay should help an appreciation not only of the novel on which this article is focused but also of Raja Rao's earlier works.—ED.]

RAJA RAO'S first novel, *Kanthapura,* was published in 1938; a collection of short stories, *The Cow of the Barricades,* came out in 1947; then, after a long interregnum, his second novel, *The Serpent and the Rope,* followed in 1960; and his latest is a novel of slender bulk, *The Cat and Shakespeare,* which appeared in 1965. *Kanthapura,* a novel of the Gandhian age, attracted little attention at the time. *The Serpent and the Rope* was more enthusiastically received, and duly won the Sahitya Akademi award. It is set in post-Independence India (or the India of the Nehru era), and through the medium of creative fiction explores the nature of Reality as distinct from the miasma of Appearance. *The Cat and Shakespeare,* on a first reading, almost defies description. Comedy, charade — what is it? But it compels attention, and one cannot help reading it again and again.

"I wanted to publish the book," Raja Rao wrote to a correspondent on *The Cat and Shakespeare,* "with about 300 blank pages at the end, to show that the real book is five hundred odd pages, and the reader must fill in the vacant spaces." Here is a role for the reader indeed — the reader as collaborator! And Raja Rao further invites the reader to "weep at every page, not for what he sees, but for what he sees he sees. For me it's like a book of prayer." It is also, if you please, "a metaphysical comedy." The reader has to decipher a great deal between the lines; he has to weep and laugh at once, and all the time; he has to lose himself in prayer; and he has to learn to cease to be himself, and become "what he sees he sees." Altogether it is asking too much of the average reader, who is always in a hurry, who looks only for a story — and for some excitement and entertainment — in a novel. But then, the reader will find these too — story, excitement, and entertainment — in *The Cat and Shakespeare.*

The novel seems to have grown out of the short story, "The Cat," which appeared in the *Chelsea Review* of New York in 1959. The "Shakespeare" of the title is a later addition. The "cat" is very much of a charac-

ter in the novel, almost *the* character, one might say, and she is very much of a symbol too. But how about "Shakespeare"? Many explanations have been offered, none entirely satisfactory. It is enough, perhaps, to say that a Shakespearian ambience interpenetrates the warp and woof of the novel, as evidenced in its catholicity, language, and poetry.

There is not much of a story. The narrator is Ramakrishna Pai, a clerk who lives away from his wife, and has a liaison with the schoolmistress, Shantha. Pai's neighbour, Govindan Nair, is a clerk too, but in the Ration Office; his speech is a "mixture of *The Vicar of Wakefield* and Shakespeare. The words are choice, the choice of the situation clumsy ... He must twist a thing into its essence and spread it out." He is, in other words, humorist, humanist, and comic metaphysician. Cats and kittens are the currency of Govindan Nair's talk:

> Have you ever seen a kitten fall? You could fall. I could fall. But the kittens walk on the wall. They are so deft. They are so young. They are so white. The mother cat watches them. And when they are about to fall, there she is, her head in the air, and picks you up by the scruff of your neck. You never know where she is. (Who has seen her? Nobody has.) To know where she is, you have to be mother's mother. And how could that ever be? Mother, I worship you ...

We all do stumble, the cleverest and the nimblest of us do; but if we had the total trust of the kitten in the mother cat, our stumbling would not matter, for we would be arrested half-way in our stumbling and jerked away to a haven of safety. This is the higher wisdom, *parāvidyā*.

But our everyday life has to be lived in this goodly world that is a prison, a prison like Denmark; at least we have to make terms with our ration shop! Now Shakespeare not only knew all about Denmark; he knew all about the ration shop too:

> Shakespeare knew every mystery of the ration shop. Here however we haven't to murder a brother to marry his wife. Here we marry whom we like. The ration card marries. You are married even when there is no wife. You are married without looking at horoscopes. The dead are not buried in ration shops. There will be no grave scenes ...

But why bother? Once we have learnt the way of the kitten, we are saved; once we know that there is a soul within and Grace above, nothing can really touch us. For the rest, well, let us play the game as best we can; the ration shop, the revenue office, the court house — they will somehow sort themselves out. There is no point in worrying, no virtue in running the rat-race like everybody else, no sense at all in getting too deeply involved in the hucksterings of the market-place.

The "action" of the novel meanders through the haze of Govindan

Nair's moods and words, his unpredictable actions and reactions. He is arrested on a charge of bribery, but the cat's wordless evidence saves him. As for Ramakrishna Pai, he has Shantha's love, and she helps him to get a house too (though not a three-storeyed one, as he had desired). And it is the cat that leads him to the threshold of the beatific vision:

> I saw nose (not the nose) and eyes seeing eyes seeing, I saw ears curved to make sound visible, and face and limbs rising in perfection for form was it. I saw love yet knew not its name but heard it as sound, I saw truth not as fact but as ignition. I could walk into fire and be cool, I could sing and be silent, I could hold myself and not be there. I saw feet. They made flowers on stems and the curved hands of children. I smelt a breath that was of nowhere but rising in my nostrils sank back into me, and found death at my door. I woke up and found death had passed by, telling me I had no business to be there. But where was I? Death said it had died. I had killed death, when you see death as death, you kill it ... I remain over, having killed myself.

The ego being dead, the Self is for ever. The way of the kitten has led perplexed Ramakrishna to the vision splendid of divine perfection and harmony and bliss. It is Bhoothalingam, the man of little faith, that comes to grief; for the cat jumps on his hand and he dies of a weak heart.

The Cat and Shakespeare seems to have baffled the critics, and no wonder: "all too chatty and catty"; "illusory non-plot"; Raja Rao is caricaturing himself; a perfect mouse trap; who can say what is happening and what's non-happening? The book does tease the reader's understanding to test whether he is capable of beyonding mere intellectual comprehension and losing himself in the silences between Govindan Nair's speeches. Raja Rao is said to have remarked that *The Cat and Shakespeare* "is substantially based on certain events in real life," and that the novel is a sequel to *The Serpent and the Rope*. There is one other clue, also provided by the author himself. In an interview published in January 1964 in the *Illustrated Weekly,* Raja Rao is reported to have said: "For me literature is *sādhanā* — not a profession but a vocation." This was so even when he wrote *Kanthapura,* "but I was then a confused and lost person. And that was why I gave up writing for a long time." Then, after he had met his Guru, Shri-Atmananda, he wrote *The Serpent and the Rope* in 1955-6. Two years later, he wrote *The Cat and Shakespeare.*

Clearly, then, *The Cat and Shakespeare* is not mere fantasy; for it is admittedly based on actual events. It is a sequel to *The Serpent and the Rope*. And all his writing is part of Raja Rao's *sādhanā* or spiritual experience, and so *Kanthapura, The Serpent and the Rope,* and "The Cat" should be viewed as steps — or paths — towards realization. If *Kantha-*

pura could be described as *purāṇa,* as a *Gandhi Purāna,* and *The Serpent and the Rope* as an epic, a mini-*Mahābhārata* that employs the idiom of our age, then *The Cat and Shakespeare* is more like one of the longer Upaniṣads, part narrative, part speculation, part dialogue or discussion. Here the recital of events zigzags rather than progresses straight on; the speculation is not so much analytical as a series of lightning flashes; and the dialogue is dialectical rather than an exchange of confidences; e.g.:

"Where does water come from?"
"From the tap."
"And the water in the tap?"
"From the lake."
"And the water in the lake?"
"From the sky."
"And the water in the sky?"
"From the ocean."
"And the water in the ocean?"
"From the rivers."
"And the river waters?"
"They make the lakes."
"And the tap water?"
"Is river water."
"And so?"
"Water comes from water."

Words, words, words; yet the Word is *Śabdabrahman* too, and the Word is behind the words. "How can a judge know the truth?" "By being it." It is the "light from the ceiling — a sunbeam, in fact" — that pierces through the paper and reveals to the Court the hidden signature behind the superficial one. Unless the light from *within,* a beam from the inner Sun, lights up the words with understanding, their true meaning will not reveal itself. The silences are more important than the spoken words, the vacant spaces in the book are more significant than the printed pages! This is seeing, not what is seen, but what is to be seen. Upanishadic illumination is a matter of lightning flashes, not the steady light of day. Hence the shortness of *The Cat and Shakespeare*; hence too its impact on us, which is akin to that of a cloudy day rent by streaks of lightning.

If Raja Rao has moved from the *purāṇic* "form" to the *itihāsic,* and from the *itihāsic* to the *upaniṣadic,* there has been a parallel movement too: from *karma* in *Kanthapura* to *jñāna* in *The Serpent and the Rope,* and on to *bhakti-prapatti* in *The Cat and Shakespeare.* Moorthy of *Kanthapura* is a man of action, and realization comes to him through political involvement and *satyāgrahic* action. Ramaswami (Rama) of *The Serpent and the Rope* is a scholar, an intellectual, a metaphysician;

he seeks realization through *jñāna,* and he knows that it is the Guru alone that will help him (Rama) to see that the *One* remains while the many change and pass. When the neophyte cries distraught "ayyo! oh! it's the serpent!" the Guru brings the lantern, lets the light fall on the ground, and says reassuringly: "It's only the rope!" But Govindan Nair is no intellectual; he is intelligent, but he is no intellectual, he is no metaphysician. Neither is Ramakrishna Pai. They are creatures of common humanity, but equally with Moorthy or Rama, they too hanker after fulfilment. For them, the path of devotion (*bhakti*) and the path of surrender (*prapatti*) — one shades off into the other — is best; following *this* path, one cannot possibly miss one's goal.

Moorthy derives his inspiration from Mahatma Gandhi, and is sustained in his work by his own aspiration and the discipline of his life. Rama realizes he has to do all by himself, though of course the Guru he seeks may give him the clue to get out of the labyrinthine *māyā* of phenomenal existence and have "*Ātma Darśan* — at the Ultimate." But for Govindan Nair, faith and surrender — or surrender born of faith — is enough; it would bring about instantaneous "*Ātma-Nivritti* — Freedom and Felicity in the Self." The moment of surrender is the moment of acceptance and safety. In the spiritual as in the physical world, action and reaction are equal and opposite. The movement towards the Mother is met by the movement of the Mother. He who chooses the Divine has been chosen by the Divine. "I like being a kitten. And how about you, Sir?" Thus Govindan Nair to Ramakrishna Pai. But Ramakrishna too learns to be a kitten in the end. Or — shall we say, Rama? Ramaswami, in *The Serpent and the Rope,* goes to his Guru to be initiated into Advaitic realization. But the Guru, perhaps, taught him the easier, the more infallible way of the kitten. No use crying frantically "ayyo! ayyo!"; better "meow-meow" trustingly! The Mother — or the mother-cat — will hear, and all will be well. It is in this sense, perhaps, that *The Cat and Shakespeare* is a sequel to *The Serpent and the Rope.* And *Kanthapura, The Serpent and the Rope,* and *The Cat and Shakespeare* make a trilogy, and present a steady progression in Raja Rao's own *sādhanā.*

Finally, *The Cat and Shakespeare* is a "metaphysical comedy," even as Dante's *Paradise* is the conclusion of his *Divine Comedy.* If there are glimpses of Inferno's circles in *Kanthapura* and of Purgatory's slopes in *The Serpent and the Rope,* in *The Cat and Shakespeare* we are whirled up by winged words and shown the "death of death" and the efflorescence of the perfect perfection of Love, Truth, and Harmony in Ramakrishna's beatific vision.

K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

WINSTON R. COOPER

A God in the Making?

[We are glad to print this brief and thoughtful article by a new contributor, Mr. Winston R. Cooper. Mr. Cooper argues closely to draw a distinction between the ego which is mortal and in his view can never become immortal and the true Self which is unconditionally immortal and infinite. This distinction is valuable in so far as it teaches us not to expect immortality for the personalities which we ordinarily are. Nevertheless, we must not forget that if divinity is infinite it is immanent within the finite and mortal self also. Theosophy teaches that the ego may therefore aspire to a conditional immortality — it may come to reflect the true Self so faithfully as to become consubstantial with that true Self and therefore be assumed into its unconditional immortality.—ED.]

THROUGHOUT the long passage of centuries in our history we have gathered around us a number of theories concerning the origin of man and of Life itself. From them we have formed various beliefs around which we have built religions and philosophies. For many of us these ideas have long since ceased to be fluid and have hardened into effective barriers which resist all attempts we might make toward true enlightenment.

That we should find ourselves with opposing opinions on this subject is not surprising considering how little we know of ourselves. Yet there is one thing most of these opinions have in common. They visualize a continuity of development taking place within the limitations of Time and Space.

Most of us can agree that whatever the cause of Life's beginning there is a continuing process of evolution from the rudimentary forms to the many varied and highly complex expressions with which we are acquainted now.

Many of us who accept an infinite intelligence as the source of all creation see man as an evolving being whose destiny is to become one with the infinite, the source of all life. In short we see Man as a God in the making, and it is this idea I want to deal with now.

When we speak of something evolving we recognize the importance of Time and Space. That which evolves can do so only within the boundaries of Time and Space. There is a beginning at some point in the past and an end at some point in the future. In effect this is saying, "That which evolves is finite."

We can see that we tend to think of creation in terms of the finite. We see a beginning, a process of evolution, and an end. We also think in terms of purpose though purpose may seem obscure. In short we appraise the question of our beginnings through the limited consciousness of the ego.

Now to understand how this consciousness is limited we must understand what the ego is. Is it the real man? or is it an illusion that obscures the real man? Does it possess the seeds of immortality? or is it destined to final obliteration?

Many of us see the ego or personality as known to those around us to possess the possibility of some future immortality. Yet, we also see that the ego is caught up in evolution. It is taught by experience. It reacts to environment. Indeed, if we consider this carefully we can see that the ego is really the total of reaction to environment whether it be in one existence or many.

It is in this way that we can understand that the ego is essentially finite, being involved in evolution and growth, and is brought into being by reaction to environment. This being so it can never possess an immortality of its own and must end at some future point. For that which is finite can never by any process become that which is infinite.

Does this mean that we have no immortality? I would say that it does not mean that at all. As it seems to me we have, all too often, wrongly identified our true selves with the illusion of the ego. If we were only the personalities known to the world, involved in evolution, and finite in quality, how does it come about that immortality and infinity are words in our language designed to express much more than this?

We must realize that man can only find something meaningful if he possesses it. Unless there were a hidden side to man that possessed immortality and the quality of the infinite these words could never have been written. Immortality and infinity would be missing from our vocabulary.

We can see there is an aspect of man many of us recognize but few understand. An aspect that is immortal and infinite. This is the true self, the real man of which the ego is, all too often, a badly distorted reflection. Indeed the relationship between the ego and true man is rather akin to the relationship between a powerful light and a mirror. At some distance the mirror reflects the light feebly. But the closer the mirror to the light the more powerful the reflection. When very close to the light the mirror itself is swallowed up in the reflection. Nevertheless, the mirror can never be part of the light.

So it is with the ego. Our personalities may reflect our true selves feebly or powerfully, but as personalities they can never be part of our true selves. The ego must be lost for ever before we can discover the true man that lies within each one of us.

Now, if the true self is immortal and infinite it cannot be bound by Time or Space, and does not, therefore, evolve. It for ever is. So it is

difficult to see Man as a God in the making. We can see this only when we are looking at ourselves through the consciousness of the ego.

Man in his true self is beyond any process of evolution or growth. He is complete, without limitation and as such is the God, the Reality, and the Truth sought by each one of us.

We must discover that so long as we are continually involved in some process of evolution and growth, no matter how desirable they may appear, we can never be aware of our true selves, for we cannot evolve towards immortality and infinite. The immortal and the infinite are immortal and infinite always without beginning, without end.

Nor can we evolve towards perfection. That which began imperfect cannot know perfection, for perfection is immortal and infinite. It is not an end in itself. Something to attain. If it were it would be the purpose and fulfilment of evolution and then would be finite and perishable.

The point of this thinking is that the true self within each one of us is not a prize to be awarded to those who produce the best efforts at learning through experience. It is not a goal to which only the superior beings amongst us may aspire. The True Self awaits only recognition.

We do not have to be clever nor do we have to be learned. We need only strive to be intelligent and discerning to discover the ego is only the mirror of Man in his true nature.

The ego is that which evolves, is finite, and can never achieve immortality. What does not evolve is the true Man in each one of us and is immortal and infinite.

It is only when evolution is brought to an end that we will find fulfilment and freedom in the completeness and harmony of our true selves.

WINSTON R. COOPER

The 28th International Congress of Orientalists

Dr. R. R. C. de Crespigny, Secretary-General of the Congress, informs us that the 28th International Congress of Orientalists will be held at the Australian National University, Canberra, A.C.T., from 6th to 12th January, 1971. All scholars of the languages, history, literature and culture of Asia are welcome.

Enquiries should be addressed to:

The Secretary-General,
28th International Congress of Orientalists,
Australian National University Post Office,
via CANBERRA CITY. A.C.T. 2601. AUSTRALIA.

New Books and Old

"The Practice of Chinese Buddhism"*

CHINESE BUDDHISM is a difficult subject for research; its practice still more so. Doctrines are easier to write about. The author has chosen modern Chinese Buddhistic practices, whose knowledge is difficult to gather in the present age.

This is an interesting and practical book, and it has a topical and modern character because it deals with the first half of the present century.

The author is a Research Associate at the East Asian Research Centre and at the Centre for the study of World Religions, Harvard University. He spent four years in the Far East, interviewing refugee monks who had held responsible posts in monasteries in many parts of the Chinese mainland. The author has not based his conclusions merely on these personal interviews with the monks and the impressions he carried from such meetings. He has also tested them with authentic documentary sources.

The dominating conclusion of the book is that the generally accepted modern theory that Buddhism is a dying religion is not correct. It also dispels many popular misconceptions about Chinese Buddhism and its practice.

A description of monastic life is always difficult, especially so for a non-monastic man. Monastic life is usually shrouded in mystery and silence and is marked by an absence of desire to communicate. But Mr. Welch, with considerable scholarship and industry, has very ably performed such a difficult task. He has viewed diverse aspects of Buddhistic monastic life in China. There is a very careful and detailed discussion of the monastic institutions. He gives a very vivid picture of the rituals and daily routine of the monasteries. A feature of this study is the description of the different ranks, offices, appointments, promotion, and retirement in the hierarchial system prevailing in these monasteries. The nature of hereditary and branch temples and the practice of collective meditation in China have been appropriately described with a wealth of information. His conclusion that collective meditation in China is a possible source of Japanese Zen Buddhism is perhaps a debatable thesis; for in a sense Zen is a rigorously individualistic discipline.

A very interesting part of this book is the description of the individual monk, the motives and incentives that make him choose monastic life; followed by a discussion of the astonishingly different types of careers among the monks. The learned author breaks new ground when he gives a very useful and informative account of monastic foundations and monastic economics. Actual case-histories of landlord-tenant relations during the Republican period of China add to the informative material of this book. The range of the book is wide. It has taken six years to write, from 1961 to 1967. It covers different aspects of Buddhism both in Republican and in Communist China.

Naturally, in a work of this kind, selection of topics becomes important. The preface makes it clear.

The broad scheme of the book is divided into two parts. The first part deals with monastic institutions, including subjects like the people of the monasteries, the meditation, and even the lay-out of the meditation hall. This part also deals with observance of the rules, the punishments, the calendar followed by the monasteries, and the daily routine about meals, dress, health, and hygiene. It is in this part also that the hierarchy is described, with the abbot, his selection either by consultation or lot, and the rites for the dead. The second part of the book deals with the

**The Practice of Chinese Buddhism: 1900–1950.* By HOLMES WELCH. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.; Oxford University Press, Bombay. 568 pp. 1967. $12.50)

individual Buddhist monk from the stage of his entering the "Sangha" and following his monastic career. This second part has a very interesting chapter on the Lay Buddhists. The Chapter on the Nature of the System describes the sects and the schools.

The first part has eight and the second has four chapters. There are nine Appendices dealing with such different subjects as the size of the "Sangha," the forty-eight positions and ranks with respective duties attached to them, and the meditation-hall schedule. The appendices are not only interesting but have added greatly to the utility of this book.

The account of the monastic régime shows how strict and rigorous it is. The day begins with morning meditation at 4 a.m. followed by breakfast at 6 a.m. The morning meditation is continued then from 7 a.m. till 9 a.m. At 9 a.m. there is a break for "noon-day rice," followed again by mid-day meditation from 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. Then there is a lunch break and a break for rest. Then again the evening meditation begins from 6 p.m. till 9 p.m. A present generation looking for luxury and comfort may at least look at the page of this life for a jolt which might prove rewarding.

In describing the nature of the system of religious practices the learned author points to the division of the Chinese Buddhists into different sects. The Confucians borrowed elements of Buddhistic metaphysics and the Buddhists adopted Confucian texts and principles as part of their common Chinese heritage. The Five Buddhist Vows are identified with the five Cardinal Virtues of the Confucians, but this does not mean that the Buddhists consider themselves Buddha-Confucians. Nor have they any organizational ties with Confucianism. The same is true of Taoism. Organizationally it was a separate religion, but there was a borrowing of gods and rites. One rarely finds a Taoist image in a Buddhist monastery. This opinion, coming as it does from the learned author, one of whose significant contributions is his work on *Taoism, the Parting of the Way,* gives food for thought and further research. In a sense neither Confucianism nor Taoism can be said to break through the general climate of Buddhism in China. During the Republican period, as throughout Chinese history, there was no one single organization to which all Buddhist monks and devotees belonged. Mostly, the various Buddhist groups were localized. What held the Chinese Buddhists together was a series of networks of affiliation, an aspect which has some similarity with the growth of Hinduism in India. The author concludes on the system of monastic organization by observing:

> There was no single organization on which all the monasteries in China depended as on a central pillar. Rather they formed a geodesic dome, joined one to another in mutual support. From the nodes of this dome, so to speak, hung families of lay people, each of which might be connected with a particular monastery in any one of several ways.

This idea may be a starting point for a new research on the patterns of religious organization in the sphere of comparative religion.

The author has rendered a significant service to our understanding of Chinese Buddhism by removing some of the prevailing and current misconceptions about it. For instance he has criticized Hackmann's following view:

> The moral level of the monks is a low one ... Their religious duties are purely mechanical, carried out within their own restricted circle, and their life, instead of being an example of self-conquest, becomes a life of utter idleness ... All intercourse with laymen is in connection with business ... Immorality of various kinds is but too common.

The learned author has also criticized Arthur Smith's view that

> Buddhism ... has long since degenerated into mere form. Its priests, like those of Taoism, are for the most part idle, ignorant, vicious parasites on the body politic. The religion, like many of its temples, is in a state of hopeless collapse.

The author quite clearly says, "Such characterizations are inadequate; they give only one side of the picture."

This is a valuable book.

P. B. MUKHARJI

World Perspective in Philosophy, Religion, and Culture: Essays presented to Professor Dhirendra Mohan Datta. (The Bihar Darshana Parishad, Patna; Bharati Bhavan, Patna. 480 pp. 1968. Rs. 50.00)

This splendid scholarly volume was presented to Professor D. M. Datta, a veteran senior professor of Indian philosophy, and ardent praticant and *chela* of Mahatma Gandhi, a bridge-builder between the East and the West for ushering in an era of understanding, by a host of admirers from the East and the West. A sheaf of articles have made the volume a classic in comparative philosophy and culture. At Shri Datta's express desire, the volume is not named after him, but is described by its contents. There are more than thirty-five articles from Indian professors. There are as many as fifteen articles from the professors of American and English universities. The topics covered by the writers converge on the theme that there is a fundamental area of agreement at the core of Eastern wisdom and Western thought. Professor Burtt's article on "A Problem in Comparative Philosophy" sets the pace, and Professor Moore answers the charge that "Western Philosophy is an 'academic exercise' without practical significance" in his critical article "The Practical Aspects of Western Philosophy." There are two insightful articles on the "Fundamental Standpoints of Early Buddhism," and on "Dignaga and the Four Buddhist Schools." It is difficult to summarize every article here in a short review. Dr. J. N. Chubb makes out that philosophy elaborates what we have posited or intuited as truths, that philosophical activity enables us to demonstrate and not discover the truth, in his article on "The Problem of Truth." We have three critical articles on Ethics from the modern linguistic point of view: "Ethics in an Age of Science," "Ethical Disagreement" and "The Three Types of Ethical Analysis." Dr. Mahadevan writes with force and conviction on the value of faith and its relation to human personality.

Professor Ewing analyses "The Concept of Democracy" and discloses its essential elements. There are two articles on "The Chinese Attitude towards World Religions," and a study of Chinese philosophy, bringing out its points of similarity to Indian philosophy, by distinguished writers, T'ang-Chun and Tan Yun-Shan. The Rev. De Smet's article on "The Nature of Christian Philosophy" merits special study. There is a valuable study of that most difficult Existentialist writer, Martin Heidegger, and the modern mood of the Existentialist in Europe by Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen.

Besides the articles the volume carries an appreciative foreword by our late President, Dr. Zakir Hussain, a biographical note on the life and writings of Dr. D. M. Datta, and a bibliography of his publications which extends over four decades. Professor W. H. Werkmeister has an excellent article at the end of the book on "Dr. Datta and the Comprehensiveness and Practicality of Philosophy."

With characteristic humility Professor Datta, while accepting the presentation of the volume, re-dedicates it to *Brahman* with the inscription, "May the Offering go to the Eternal." Rightly do the editors describe Datta with the line from the *Bhagavad-Gītā*: "Such a soul is difficult to find" (*Sa mahātmā sudurlabhaḥ*).

P. NAGARAJA RAO*

The Book of Change: A New Translation of the Ancient Chinese I Ching (Yi King), with Detailed Instruction for its Practical Use in Divination. By JOHN BLOFELD. Foreword by LAMA ANAGARIKA GOVINDA. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 228 pp. 1968. Paperback, 16*s*.)

* Our reviewer has himself contributed an essay on "Trends in Contemporary Philosophy" to the volume.—ED.

This most ancient book of divination, treasured by Confucius, deals with the laws of transformation and periodicity — still largely unknown territory for Western science, and with the intimate relation (macrocosm-microcosm) between nature and man. The approach to it demands intuition and religious reverence, as well as scientific observation and grasp of law. It should be applied, John Blofeld reminds readers, not for frivolous, selfish purposes, but "to determine the surest way to live in harmony with the circumstances prevailing." He has used, in his translation, the simplest language possible (as far as the subject-matter permits) to enable those readers prepared "to test its powers in all sincerity," to divine from "the interplay of universal forces" the general trends and tendencies, and thus to choose a right course of action or inaction.

Following the preliminary chapters, Mr. Blofeld gives the symbolic basis of the 8 trigrams and their expansion into 64 hexagrams (each composed of unbroken and-or broken lines). He describes the ritual of divination, the method of interpretation, warning against letting the desire-mind substitute wishful thinking for objective truth. Part Two provides the Text and Commentaries, while the Appendix gives further tables and more elaborate diagrams.

This serious recognition of a science and art of divination would have been almost unheard of not so long back, even though C. G. Jung was willing to imperil his reputation by asserting the validity of the predictions given by the "divining straws." The book's publication in 1965 and its appearance now as a well-produced paperback is one indication, among many, of the general change of outlook during the past few decades. It will still remain, perhaps fortunately, gibberish to the selfish majority, or a tantalizing occult cipher to the impatient devotee of "fortune-telling magic," but for those who are prepared to make use of this ancient wisdom rightly, the book, to judge from the reports of those who have treated its profound magic with respect, is one to be valued, and lived with.

E. WHITE

The Doctor and the Soul: From Psychotherapy to Logotherapy. By VIKTOR E. FRANKL. Translated by RICHARD and CLARA WINSTON. (Souvenir Press Ltd., London. xxii+291 pp. 1969. 35*s*.)

This book is written by a physician who lives so fully within the structure of existentialism that the text provides, almost unintentionally, one feels, a most readable and interesting exposition of that way of life. The author is, in a fact, a psychiatrist of the Viennese School, with an international reputation. He survived Auschwitz and Dachau and, when finally liberated, found that his family had been almost obliterated. Thus the chapter "On the Psychology of the Concentration Camp" is based on first-hand experience and explains some of those problems which are very difficult, for those who have had no comparable experience, to grasp.

The book comprises an introduction, which is a shortened version of a paper read to the Royal Society of Medicine in 1954, a short descriptive section "From Psychotherapy to Logotherapy," a main part entitled "From Psychoanalysis to Existential Analysis" and two short sections, one on the more practical aspects of logotherapy and one on secular confession and medical ministry. The main part of the book has chapters on "the meaning of life," " — death," " — suffering," " — work" and " — love," in addition to the chapter on concentration camp psychology. Throughout this section three categories of values are discussed and illustrated: creative values associated with activity, experimental values associated with reception of sensory experiences, and attitudinal values determining the response of a human being to the limiting factors of his life. Every situation of life becomes worth-while and acceptable

if these values are rightly understood, and many personal stories of the behaviour of patients are given to illustrate the fact. The chapter on the meaning of death is particularly relevant in view of current interest in euthanasia. The chapter on the meaning of suffering presents a philosophy of the value and acceptance of suffering which could well help those who are not attracted by the orthodox religions.

The latter part of the book would primarily interest psychotherapists but it can also be readily understood by the layman. There is a bibliography, but work mentioned in the text cannot always be traced through the references (e.g., Dr. Hoff, p. 81). This book can certainly be recommended to all who seek to understand life, but do not readily find an explanation in materialism, or in the orthodox religions.

PHYLLIS G. CROFT

Culture, Anarchy and the Public Schools. By T. E. B. HOWARTH. (Cassell and Company Ltd., London. 96 pp. 1969. 21*s*.)

This examination of the question of the public schools in relation to the social and cultural pressures of our own time ranges over a very wide field and requires a certain standard of education and persevering attention on the part of the reader. Thus it may well be that the author will find himself preaching to the converted.

I would recommend most people to read the Appendix first, being the principal recommendations in the first Report of the Public Schools Commission, a report which the author rejected.

To put it very simply, Mr. Howarth, at the top of the *élite* (High Master of St. Paul's School), and I, a humble primary school teacher, both find that "all children and all the families of which they form part are different." He then gives us some extremely interesting and entertaining accounts of just how different they may be, and also some staggering examples of contradictory statements by many educational researchers and authors.

The chapters, "Equality and Élitism," "Edmass" (a thought-provoking description of some of the extravagances and unreality of much modern educational theory), and another on the Newsom report will no doubt shock many people who have little understanding of the chaos of thought prevalent in the world of education today.

I would like his comments on the advice given to a student-teacher who was inflicted on me these last few weeks. Her Professor told her, seriously, "Oh, it doesn't matter *how* much noise they make ... you must stimulate them ..." which she certainly did with experiments using lard and mud and soapy water! Also: "It doesn't matter a *bit* if they can't read by the time they're eleven." After which, what?

Finally, it would be refreshing if the critics of the Public and Grammar schools, who advocate "comprehensive" and "unstreamed" classes, would be honest enough to realize and admit that "streaming" or the grouping of children of roughly equal ability goes on in every faintly successful class. If you have a mixed age and ability class they "stream" themselves ... some learn to read in two or three months ... and get on with all kinds of lessons ... others take two or three years and a vast amount of the teacher's energy. It is impossible to keep the children "equal"; they just don't grow that way.

One complaint: no index, which is a pity, for such a book should be used a lot and referred to often.

ELIZABETH CROSS

As Above So Below: A Study in Cosmic Progression. By WARREN KENTON. (Stuart and Watkins, London. vii+68 pp. Illustrated. 1969. 30*s*; i.e., £1.50)

This is a fascinating book wonderfully

illustrated with thirty-eight full-page, often double-page, photographs taken mainly by space-craft, satellites, or capsules or through the great telescopes of the Mt. Wilson and Palomar Observatories. Aided by the sensitively written text we journey through the universe, through the various levels of creation, starting with nebulae, star clusters, and those mysterious centres of force, nuclei, and ending with more familiar, though no less wondrous things nearer us — tides, weather, plants, the human mind, and the rise and fall of civilizations on this our own planet.

The over-all impression is of order and unity. Instead of recoiling from the vastness and seeming meaninglessness, we gain a strong sense of being part of a living Whole with which every unit, down to the least, is in appropriate relationship. Definite arrangements are seen to prevail throughout the cosmos, governed by the same principles of development and activity, from the Infinite Void which is the Shadow of the Absolute to the point at which "man completes the organic cycle, marrying in his body all the Realms below," (p. 46), and able (in reverse) to enter or re-enter those above through what Blake calls "the doors of perception."

Some of these are certainly opened for us by the remarkable photographs — a picture-gallery of that universe of which we can, directly, know but the fraction of a pinpoint — and for this alone the book should prove invaluable to every type of reader, even those least inclined to, or tolerant of, metaphysics! For those who do pursue that subject, especially along the lines of the Ancient Wisdom, it is good to see how these latest discoveries of the space-age confirm the tenets of Occultism.

"As above so below" is one of the oldest Hermetic sayings, and the Law of Correspondences between the human monad and its cosmic environment is well illustrated by this impressive book.

JOAN N. BURNETT

Philosophical Analysis: its Development Between the Two World Wars. By J. O. URMSON. (Oxford University Press, New York. 203 pp. 1967. Paperback, $1.50)

Professor Urmson rightly observes that "among the philosophers who were most influential in England in the period between two World Wars were the analysts." His account of the movement was first published in 1956 and issued as an Oxford University Press paperback in 1967.

In a short compass the writer has given a full picture of the analytic movement between the two World Wars. Its historical antecedents and later development have all been examined with meticulous care and exemplary detachment. Russell's logical atomism and the views of Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* have been naturally given pride of place as they have directly or indirectly led to a new conception of the nature of philosophy and to a new approach to philosophical problems as a whole. G. E. Moore has been given his due as the co-founder of the analytic movement with Russell, and the development of Logical Positivism with occasional shifts in its position has been faithfully described.

Professor Urmson is, of course, aware that when he refers to contemporary philosophy he has in mind only an important cross-section of contemporary thought. Apart from the Vienna School of philosophers and Wittgenstein, we are concerned here only with the leading British philosophers, mostly belonging to Oxford and Cambridge.

But in spite of all these regional limitations the development of philosophical thought in Britain between the two world wars and its persistent impact on the post-war period deserves serious consideration even by those who are not prepared to think of analysis as a significant phenomenon in recent thought. One characteristic feature of British philosophy from Locke, Berkeley, and Hume to Russell, Moore,

Ryle, and Ayer has been its honesty, clarity, and precision; and Professor Urmson has been able to maintain this tradition without any difficulty.

SYED VAHIDUDDIN

Religious and Anti-Religious Thought in Russia. By GEORGE L. KLINE. (The Weil Lectures. University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London. iv+179 pp. 1968. 67*s*. 6*d*.)

In the twentieth century religious thinking in Russia has encompassed a spectrum wider than anywhere else in Europe. The major themes are discussed in Professor G. Kline's *Religious and Anti-Religious Thought in Russia.* The ultra-conservatism of pre-Revolution Byzantine Orthodoxy bred many reactions: its critics, both Christian and non-Christian, were numerous and varied. Anarchism, political and cultural, represented one of the earliest sustained critiques of organized religion: the negative materialistic atheism of a Bakunin was overshadowed by the anarchist-pacifism of Tolstoy, who rejected institutional religion but yearned for a renewed ethical Christianity. Social conservatives attacked from the other end: Leontyev feared egalitarianism and socialism, Rozanov was contemptuous of liberalism and science. extolling an ecstatic naturalism. Shestov pleaded for an irrational existentialism.

Nicholas Berdyaev is somewhat undervalued by the author, yet must surely be reckoned the outstanding Russian religious thinker of modern times. Berdyaev drank deeply at the wells of Kant and Nietzsche, Marx and Dostoevsky, yet was essentially original. His existentialism is much closer to Kierkegaard than to Heidegger or Sartre. His mystical understanding owed much to Jacob Boehme. He rejected communist collectivism in favour of a spiritual socialism, in which the ethics of love and freedom, inspired by a vision of a mystically harmonious universe, would motivate society and render all compulsive legalisms unnecessary. Berdyaev's sweeping vision of history moving to its spiritual denouement, and his doctrine of Man's divinely-derived co-creativity with God, are pregnant with meaning for our own day.

The land which produced the Communist Revolution has confronted religion with a vast intellectual challenge, both in the philosophical materialism of Marxism and the empirical dismissal of religion as an instrument of class domination. Kline's all-too-brief discussion of "the God-Builders" is fascinating: Gorky and Lunacharski saw Socialism as building a new man and a new world, with achievements of man in centuries to come rendering him truly God-like. Russian Communist Orthodoxy, no less than Christian Orthodoxy, rejected this: religion is innocent superstition or a capitalist weapon. Yet pseudo-religious Prometheanism keeps cropping up, particularly in the fascination of Russian science with ideas of physical prolongation of life to the point of immortality. But Pasternak, Sinyavski, and Solzhenitsyn testify to the enduring, living stream of Russian spirituality.

BRIAN G. COOPER

The Kingdom of the Young. By VERRIER ELWIN. (Oxford University Press, Bombay. xix+261 pp. Illustrated. 1968. Rs. 25.00)

This is the abridged version of a larger work, *The Muria and Their Ghotul,* which dealt comprehensively with this tribal community of the former Princely State of Bastar in Madhya Pradesh. It concentrates on one aspect of Muria life, the *ghotul* or the village dormitory for the young. Writing his Preface in 1963, the author made clear that he offered this book "not as a contemporary record ... but as an aspect of India's tribal history." And herein lies its special

value. Civilization, as we understand it, has made considerable inroads into both rural and tribal India and much that was peculiar to particular groups of people has gradually changed or is in the process of being completely lost. This book is therefore very valuable as an extremely interesting and painstaking anthropological and social record.

Tracing the origins of this not unusual institution among primitive societies and studying it as probably the most important factor conditioning the Muria's attitude to sex, marriage, religion, and moral standards, Verrier Elwin brings out that premarital promiscuity — so much frowned upon by well-meaning reformers — is only one aspect of life in the *ghotul*. Quoting from another student of tribal life, he points out:

> It is an institution that has manifold uses. It teaches social habits to the youths of both the sexes. It trains them in post-marital behaviour and makes them useful members of society. It inculcates a feeling of tribal discipline, provides a focus for the sentiments of the people and prepares the younger generation to discharge those social and economic obligations without which collective life of any kind can neither grow nor thrive.

In addition, the *ghotul* seems to make for better sexual adjustment and marital relationships. "There are few people with a stronger sense of domestic morality and conjugal fidelity than the Muria." Again the Muria, as Elwin substantiates with statistics, is singularly free from sexual aberrations, and crimes of passion are rare. Prostitution is unheard of and child marriages uncommon.

In the context of the sexual permissiveness now common in the West, this study, as the author himself says, opens up the widest problems of sex and marriage: "The village dormitory is a symptom of a certain stage of cultural development. We ourselves consider that we have outgrown it; we may grow into it again."

I. MONANI

Ends and Sayings

"... ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
—SAMUEL BUTLER: *Hudibras*

Sir Kenneth Clark's thirteen talks on BBC-2 on "The Nature of Civilization" (reprinted in *The Listener* from the end of February to the middle of May 1969) formed a notable landmark, not only for their superb and stimulating visual presentation, illustrating the major facets of culture and civilization — i.e., European civilization, with a few references to Eastern and Egyptian — from the time of the eclipse of the Graeco-Roman world (the fading out or deliberate destruction of the classical heritage) through the cyclic changes of devastation and renewal, era by era, to the nineteenth century.

Each destruction seemed like the death and loss of what had been gained, but each new wave of energy, each intensification of awareness, brought into play new viewpoints and powers. To take an example, the discoveries made by Renaissance man — "discovery of the individual, belief in the human genius, sense of harmony between man and his surroundings" — seemed to have been lost in the wars of the sixteenth century. Yet out of that "confusion and brutality" developed new faculties, "the power of thought and expression" (*The Listener,* 3 April 1969). Later on still, "the triumph of rational philosophy brought a new barbarism with it" (*The Listener,* 17 April 1969) — each step forward carried its own shadow, its nemesis. It is a fascinating portrayal,

with intimations of an organic breathing structure to history.

Stanley Reynolds's praise of the series (*The Guardian,* 19 May 1969) is significant in throwing light on his own outlook, his own search for true greatness. Some time before, in a review of the loudly-proclaimed television series based on Galsworthy's *Forsyte Saga,* he had compared the *Saga* with Tolstoy's *War and Peace,* in an endeavour to assess what made the latter great, and the former not. For him, the most important theme of "The Nature of Civilization" was Sir Kenneth's "definition of what a civilized man is, or should be, or, at least, has been," and the tribute paid throughout to the heroic spirit of man, "conscious of something about himself" outside ordinary values. However varied the age, the language, the race and religion of the makers of civilization, the geniuses, they all had in common "the need to approach as nearly as possible to an ideal of perfection — reason, justice, physical beauty, all of them in equilibrium." To intelligence they added "the quality of heroic will." Reynolds rejoices that the series "with its constant praise of the unfashionable heroic man, has shone out bright among the grey and gutless expediency of contemporary criticism."

Is it possible that there are many more intelligent people than supposed with a regard for the ideal of the heroic man, but that they have remained silent for the same reason that people have kept quiet about their own experiences of precognition, clairvoyance, telepathy, and other para-psychological faculties — for fear of ridicule?

Professor Bernard Crick of Sheffield University commends (*The Observer,* 18 May 1969) the report of the Committee (chaired by Professor H. L. A. Hart) on the relations of Oxford University with its junior members. It "marks a new, good style of open and explanatory university government." University discipline is being changed to a less arbitrary system. In dealing with student participation, the report defines excellently the nature of legitimate authority. It recommends recognition of the new Student Representative Council. Quite apart from demonstrations of violence, the demand for "long overdue reform of university communications and discussion of 'what,' 'why,' and 'how' in syllabuses" is sound and reasonable. On the other hand, Professor Crick suggests that it would help if students were more mature when they came to a university, i.e., if, before coming, they had two or more years earning their living in the world.

> I am a great believer in the "mature student," the older student, who gets far more out of it and *gives more* [italics ours] than the, at times, rather perplexing mixture of assertiveness and insecurity that 17- and 18-years-olds feel on entering genuine universities.

They want to be treated as mature, independent adults, yet generally still need the support of halls of residence and health services, as well as sufficient guidance and direction in their studies. They are less independent in their thinking than in their manner.

Perhaps the clue is here. The break from school and home into the university atmosphere is too sharp. If there were, already at school, more free, independent thinking (of a real sort, not the mere airing of opinion), and more responsibility given in the home, students would be better equipped to deal with the opportunities and the obstacles of the university. Earning one's living can encourage a measure of adaptability and resourcefulness.

Professor Max Beloff, Gladstone Professor of Government and Public Administration at Oxford, made the same point in the *Oxford Magazine* (reported, *Daily Telegraph,* 31 January 1969) that far more people would benefit from a university if they had previously held down a job or were currently doing so. The practical experience would show the problems that really interested them. We might add that it would also give a greater sense of proportion than the narrow, hedged way from school to university and possibly back again to teaching. And not only for students, but also

for the cloistered academics, such a sense of proportion gained by a period of "active service" in the world would be a virtue.

The deadliness of mass production on the assembly line and the general dehumanizing of the workers has probably been more responsible for trouble and unrest in factories than anything else, however much the issue may have been masked by pay demands.

One firm at least has learned the lesson that workers are intelligent human beings and must be treated as such. Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken NV (radio and pharamaceuticals) in Holland has, after five years' experimentation, seen that the outcome of trying to mould workers to the machine's pattern is "high labour turnover, increasing absenteeism, poor morale." Hitherto it has been thought that some jobs are inevitably and unalterably boring, and with mass production methods are indeed so, when work is split up into monotonous, repetitive, specialized tasks, demanding little skill. Now, workers' "motivations and capacities" are considered. Grouped in small teams, each assembling complete units, they have a greater feeling of creativity. Girls assembling complete television sets in small teams felt satisfaction, wastage from errors dwindled, and production benefited. Experiments in light-bulb assembly were carried even further along the lines of fostering capacity and interest instead of treating workers as unskilled labour. Small production teams, without foremen, supervisors, or rules, worked without having to clock in, fitting their required hours of work to suit, deciding what they could tackle and where they needed help. In other words, they were made responsible for their work. (Andrew Leigh, in *The Observer*, 4 May 1969).

The rather repellent term "work structuring" has been given to this new method. It has wider repercussions on industry, since, apart from the boost to morale, it has eliminated up to 30 percent of indirect (supervisory) manpower in four years, without necessarily producing redundancy, since spreading responsibility allows more opportunities for useful work.

Previously, only 37 per cent of those who left the firm liked the work. After restructuring, 91 per cent of workers liked their jobs. A Philips sociologist has said: "We need a non-mechanistic conception of what efficiency means."

Could one not carry the idea further, since at present it still has overtones of self-interest? The ultimate and unassailable efficiency is not merely that of the individual human principle, but surely that of the higher soul — "Yoga is skill in the performance of action," or one might say, spirit, soul, mind, and body in union, and functioning together in effective selfless action.

In Memoriam: L. Shankara Doraiswamy

We regret to announce the untimely and sudden death, at the age of thirty-nine, of Shri L. Shankara Doraiswamy, Branch Manager of International Book House, at Bangalore, who for several years had been acting as Publisher and Printer of THE ARYAN PATH. His energy and co-operativeness were a great support, and his liveliness and readiness to help had brought him a wide circle of friends. He will be affectionately remembered and the loss keenly felt.